In this paper, we study the resource allocation and trajectory design for secure unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled communication systems, where multiple multi-purpose UAV base stations are dispatched to provide secure communications to multiple legitimate ground users (GUs) in the existence of multiple eavesdroppers (Eves). Specifically, by leveraging orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), active UAV base stations can communicate to their desired ground users via the assigned subcarriers while idle UAV base stations can serve as jammer simultaneously for communication security provisioning. To achieve fairness in secure communication, we maximize the average minimum secrecy rate per user by jointly optimizing the communication/jamming subcarrier allocation policy and the trajectory of UAVs, while taking into account the constraints on the minimum safety distance among multiple UAVs, the maximum cruising speed, the initial/final locations, and the existence of cylindrical no-fly zones (NFZs). The design is formulated as a mixed integer non-convex optimization problem which is generally intractable. Subsequently, a computationally-efficient iterative algorithm is proposed to obtain a suboptimal solution. Simulation results illustrate that the performance of the proposed iterative algorithm can significantly improve the average minimum secrecy rate compared to various baseline schemes. R. Li and J. An are with the secure UAV communication systems with a single-UAV was studied in [8], [14]-[16] with different system settings. However, due to the stringent requirements on UAV's size, weight, and power (SWAP), the performance achieved by deploying a single-UAV is still limited [6]. To achieve a higher efficiency in secure communications, multi-UAV cooperation was adopted in [17]-[20]. In particular, a jammer UAV can fly close to a potential eavesdropper based on demand by leveraging its mobility and opportunistically transmits artificial noise signal deliberately to combat the eavesdropping channels [17]. To improve the system security performance, [18] and [19] presented a cooperative jamming approach to safeguard the UAV's communication by exploiting artificial jamming transmission from other friend UAVs in the existence of a single-eavesdropper. With the consideration of fairness in two-UAV secure communications, [20] investigated the joint power allocation and trajectory design for the maximization of the minimum secrecy rate per user when one UAV is dispatched to convey confidential messages to a ground user where another cooperative UAV transmits a jamming signal. However, in [17]-[20], the role of the UAV is fixed where a communication/jamming UAV can only provide either communication/jamming signal during the whole time horizon.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growing demand on wireless communication services, e.g. ultra-high data rates and massive connectivity [2] , has fueled the development of wireless networks and the mass productions of wireless devices. Despite the fruitful research in the literature for providing ubiquitous services, the performance of wireless systems is limited by the users with poor channel conditions [3] , [4] . Fortunately, owing to the high flexibility and low cost in deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV-enabled communication offers a promising solution to tackle these challenges [5] . In particular, the high mobility of UAVs facilitates the establishment of strong line-of-sight (LoS) links to ground users (GUs). Hence, in recent years, numerous applications of UAV-enabled communication have emerged dramatically not only in the military domain, but also in the civilian and commercial domains, such as disaster relief, archeology, pollution monitoring, commodity delivery, etc. [6] . Besides, several world-leading industrial companies, such as Facebook, Google, and Qualcomm, have made advancements on their journey to deliver high-speed internet from the air by UAVs [1] . As a result, the investigation of deploying UAVs for assisting wireless networks has recently received significant attention from the academia, such as mobile relays [7] , [8] , aerial mobile base stations [9] , [10] , and UAV-enabled information dissemination and data collection [1] , [11] .
In practical systems, although the nature of strong LoS link grants UAV-based communication as an appealing approach to provide ubiquitous high-data rate wireless service, it also makes the communication between a UAV and ground users more susceptible to be intercepted by potential eavesdroppers (Eves) [12] . Therefore, it imposes various fundamental challenges for secure UAV communication provisioning [13] . To meet this emerging need, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) communication systems, where multiple rotary-wing UAVs base stations are dispatched to provide communications to multiple ground users with the existence of multi-eavesdropper and NFZs. We jointly design the resource allocation, trajectory design, and role selection for secure communication. In particular, the role of each UAV can be switched dynamically between serving as a jamming UAV or information UAV in each time slot and subcarrier. The design optimization problem is non-convex and generally intractable. To handle the above challenges, we first transform the original problem into its equivalent problem, which facilitates the application of alternating optimization for obtaining a suboptimal solution. In particular, the original optimization problem is divided into three subproblems, i.e., communication resource allocation, jamming policy, and UAVs' trajectories design, which to be solved iteratively. In each iteration, the communication resource allocation is designed by solving its Lagrangian dual problem. To derive jamming policy and UAVs' trajectories, a suboptimal iterative algorithm is proposed by utilizing successive convex approximation (SCA) techniques [18] - [20] with a fast convergence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and the problem formulation for the considered cooperative multi-UAV enabled wireless system. In Section III, we propose an efficient iterative algorithm based on the Lagrange dual problem and SCA techniques which can obtain a suboptimal solution of the design problem at hand. Section V provides numerical results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithms. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
Notations: · denotes the vector norm. [x] + = max{0, x}.
[·] T denotes the transpose operation. For a vector a, a represents its Euclidean norm.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication system consisting of K U downlink users, K E eavesdroppers, M rotary-wing UAVs denoted by set k U ∈ K U {1, · · · , K U }, k E ∈ K E {1, · · · , K E }, and m ∈ M {1, · · · , M }, respectively. In the system, we adopt the OFDMA scheme for serving multiple downlink users with different subcarriers at the same time [1] , [26] . Besides, the system bandwidth is divided equally into N F orthogonal subcarriers, which is denoted by set i ∈ N F {1, · · · , N F }. As there are multiple eavesdroppers in the system, we exploit the geometrically distributed nature of UAVs and advocate the use of their dynamical role switching for guaranteeing secure communication. To be more specific, 
A. Signal Model
We express the locations of all users, eavesdroppers, and UAVs in a three-dimensional (3D)
Cartesian coordinate system. For the ease of design, the total time T is discretized into N time slots with equal-duration, i.e., δt = T /N , which is small enough such that the distance between the UAV and the ground user within each time slot can be treated as a constant 3 .
Furthermore, we adopt n as the time slot index where n ∈ N {1, · · · , N }. Thus, the ground projected trajectory of UAV m, q m (t) = [x m (t), y m (t)], 0 ≤ t ≤ T , over the time T can be approximated by a sequence {q m [n] = [x m [n], y m [n]] T } N n=1 , where q m [n] q m (nδt), ∀n, m, denotes the horizontal location of UAV m in time slot n. Besides, the maximum speed of each UAV are denoted as v max in meters per second (m/s) and the UAV's maximum aviation distance in each time slot is V = v max δt in meters. In particular, without lost of generality, we assume that the initial location and the final location for UAV m projected on the ground 1 We assume that there are secure backhaul links for conveying a user's data between UAV and a core network which can be established by e.g. out-of-band links [9] , [10] . 2 The cost of the proposed role switching is mainly on the required signaling overhead for the coordination between the cooperative UAVs. 
Then, the distance between UAV m and user k U in time slot n can be written as
where H in meters is the constant flying altitude of each UAV for satisfying some safety regulations. Similarly, the distance between UAV m and Eve k E in time slot n is given by 
Remark 1: A reasonable UAV trajectory should be planed such that a UAV can follow the desired path as tightly as possible. Based on the geometric and kinematics properties, cylindrical volumn models for NFZ satisfy lateral guidance control law of UAVs which are commonly adopted for the design of flight path, e.g. [27] , [28] . When a UAV has to avoid flying over NFZs, a centripetal acceleration on the UAV is generated to help the UAV change its aviation direction. The centripetal acceleration is related to the UAV's radial flying velocity and radius of turning circle, which leads to a circular trajectory when the UAV turns steadily [29] . Therefore, for the purpose to design a more practical NFZ model so that a UAV can tightly follow its desired flight path, NFZs are modeled by cylindrical volume constraints in this paper.
C. Channel Model
We assume that the wireless channels from a UAV to the ground user/Eve on each subcarrier are LoS-dominated and we adopt the commonly used free-space path loss model 4 as in [6]- 4 We note that field measurements [30] suggest that air-to-ground links are almost guaranteed to be LoS channels in rural areas when a UAV flies with an altitude of 100 meters or above to serve a cell with a radius of 500 meters. Furthermore, the aviation altitude of a UAV can be adjusted according to the type of terrain and the scale of the cells, which can guarantee that the air-to-ground channel LoS probability approaches one [31] .
March 17, 2020 DRAFT [7] . Furthermore, we assume that the Doppler effect caused by the mobility of UAVs can be well compensated by all the receivers 5 . Thus, the channel power gain from UAV m to ground user k U in time slot n can be given by
where β 0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference distance d 0 = 1 m. Similarly, channel power gains from UAV m to Eve k E in time slot n can be written as
D. Communication & Jamming Scheduling Model
To prevent multiple access interference from all the communication UAVs, in time slot n, we assume that there is at most one UAV communicates with at most one user on subcarrier i. On the other hand, since there are multiple Eves randomly distributed on the ground and multiple UAVs in the sky, when subcarrier i is not assigned to UAV m for information transmission, UAV m can act as a jammer on this subcarrier to combat the channel of Eves.
For the sake of presentation and to facilitate the solution design, we denote s m,k U ,i [n] ∈ {0, 1} and s J m,i [n] ∈ {0, 1} as binary variables, which indicates that if UAV m communicates with user k U , i.e., s m,k U ,i [n] = 1 or acts as a jammer, i.e., s J m,i [n] = 1 in time slot n on subcarrier i, respectively. In particular, the binary variables satisfy the following constraints:
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first define the achievable rate and secrecy rate for the considered multi-UAV system. Then, the multi-UAV secure communication system design is formulated as a non-convex optimization problem.
A. Achievable Rate & Secrecy Rate
Denote p m,k U ,i [n] ≥ 0 as the communication power from UAV m to user k U in time slot n on subcarrier i, p J m,i [n] ≥ 0 as the jamming power from UAV m in time slot n on subcarrier i, and P m peak the peak transmission power of UAV m. Then, we have
Information power
Jamming power
Thus, if UAV m is selected to communicate to user k U in time slot n on subcarrier i, i.e., s m,k U ,i [n] = 1, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at user k U on subcarrier i in time slot n can be written as
where σ 2 denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power at ground users and
represents the co-channel interference caused by UAV m ∈ M, m = m, to user k U on subcarrier i.
On the other hand, the received SINR at Eve k E from UAV m for attempting to decode the signal of user k U in time slot n on subcarrier i can be written as
where
is the interference to Eve k E on subcarrier i in time slot n.
Thus, the communication rate R m,k U ,i [n] from UAV m to user k U in time slot n on subcarrier i in bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz) is given by
while the corresponding leakage rate R m,k E ,i [n] to Eve k E can be written as
Then, the average secrecy rateR s k U in bps/Hz over N time slots for user k U considered with K E eavesdroppers is given bȳ 
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
where constraint C1 is imposed to guarantee an average minimum secrecy rate η for each user over all time slots. C2 and C3 are the binary constraints to denote the UAV's communication and jamming subcarrier allocation, respectively. Constraint C4 is imposed to make sure that in any time slot, each subcarrier can be allocated to at most one user for communication from 
IV. JOINT TRAJECTORY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION DESIGN
The formulated problem in (18) is a mixed-integer non-convex and generally intractable.
Specifically, the main obstacle in solving (18) arises from the binary constraints C2 and C3 while the non-convexity originates from C1, C6a, C8, and C9. Besides, the problem is further complicated by the coupling between binary and continuous variables in C1 and C6a.
Therefore, obtaining the globally optimal solution requires a prohibitively large computational complexity which is not practical even for moderate system size. As a compromise approach, in this section, we propose a series of transformation which facilitates the development of a low-complexity algorithm for achieving a suboptimal solution 6 . To this end, we first propose Lemma 1 to handle the non-smoothness function due to the [·] + operation in constraint C1 of problem (18) .
Lemma 1: Problem (18) has the same optimal solution as the following problem:
Proof 1: Please refer to Appendix A for a proof of Lemma 1.
Although problem (19) is easier to handle, it is still non-convex and challenging to solve.
Next, we divide problem (19) into three subproblems with three individual sets of optimization variables, respectively, i.e., (η, S U , P U ), (η, S J , P J ), (η, Q), which facilitates the design of a computationally efficient iterative alternating algorithm to achieve a suboptimal solution, cf. Fig. 2 . In particular, we first jointly optimize the average minimum secrecy data rate, communication user scheduling, and communication power of each UAV. Then, with fixed trajectories and obtained communication policy, we study the jamming scheduling and jamming power allocation, for obtaining an intermediate optimized average minimum secrecy data rate. In the last subproblem, we design all UAVs' trajectories and update the average minimum secrecy data rate with the above obtained resource allocation policy.
A. Subproblem 1: Communication Resource Allocation Optimization
In this section, we consider subproblem 1 for optimizing the communication user scheduling and communication power by assuming that jamming policy (S J , P J ) and all UAVs' trajectories Q are fixed. Thus, subproblem 1 can be written as:
In order to solve subproblem 1 in (20), by following a similar approach as [16] , [41] , we
, and the problem can be equivalently written as
March 17, 2020 DRAFT Next, we handle the binary user scheduling constraint C2 in (21) . In particular, we follow a similar approach as in [1] , [41] and relax the binary subcarrier variable s m,k U ,i [n] as a real value between 0 and 1, i.e.,
Meanwhile, the relaxed variable s m,k U ,i [n] serves as a time-sharing factor for user k U on subcarrier i in time slot n.
After replacing C2 with › C2 in (21), the problem can be written 7 as
Then, before we derive the optimal communication resource allocation, we first verify the convexity of constraint › C1 jointly with respect to (w.r.t.) s m,k U ,i [n] and p m,k U ,i [n] via the following lemma: [44] . Therefore, the duality gap is zero. In other words, the optimal solution of problem (27) can be obtained by solving its dual problem. To shed lights on important system design 7 We note that the adopted constraint relaxation is tight as will be shown in the following.
insights, we solve the dual problem via deriving some semi-closed-form solutions. To this end, we first derive the Lagrangian of problem (27):
and ϑ = {ϑ m [n] > 0, ∀n, m}, denote the Lagrange multipliers for constraints › C1, C4, C5, and fi C6a, respectively. Constraints C2 and fi C6b will be considered when deriving the optimal solution via examining the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions in the following. Thus, the dual problem of (27) can be written as
Then, by using dual decomposition [45] , the dual problem can be solved iteratively by solving the two layers which is divided from the dual problem: Layer 1, maximizing the the optimal solutions of subproblem 1. Thus, the optimal power allocation for user k U on subcarrier i in time slot n is given by
We note that the solution derived in (30) from other users on subcarrier i in time slot n. According to the KKT conditions [42] , the following equality holds at the optimal point of the problem in (21):
Therefore, Lagrange multiplier α k U ,k E is used to adjust the resource allocation such that constraint C1 is satisfied with equality. In fact, it reallocates the resource from the stronger users to weaker users to achieve certain fairness between users. On the other hand, Lagrange multiplier ϑ m [n] > 0 adjusts the water level to satisfy constraint fi C6a. Then, the optimal subcarrier allocation can be obtained via the derivative of the Lagrangian function w.r.t.
, with the consideration of constraint C4, the optimal user scheduling on subcarrier i for UAV m in each time slot n is given by
the solution is still binary, which means that the relaxation adopted in › C2 is tight.
Solution of Layer 2 (Master Problem):
To solve the master minimization problem in (29), we adopt the gradient method to update the Lagrange multipliers which is given by
where l 1 ≥ 0 is the iteration index for subproblem 1 and δ u (l 1 ), u ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, is the step size [41] . Thus, subproblem Layer 1 in problem (29) can be solved by using the updated Lagrangian multipliers in (34)- (37) . The proposed Algorithm for solving subproblem 1 is summarized in Algorithm 1. Specifically, we solve the power allocation and user scheduling via the semi-closed-form solutions in (30) and (33), respectively, with a given Lagrange 
4:
Maximize the Lagrangian over the minimum secrecy rate η, user scheduling SU , and power allocationPU in (29) with the given Lagrange multipliers α, β, ε, ϑ.
5:
repeat {Master Problem}
6:
Minimize the Lagrangian function in (29) over the Lagrange multipliers α, β, ε, ϑ, for a fixed minimum secrecy rate η, user scheduling SU , and power allocationPU .
7:
until Convergence = true or l inner
multipliers as shown in line 4 of Algorithm 1. Then, we update Lagrange multipliers via the gradient method (34)-(37) as shown in line 6 of Algorithm 1.
B. Subproblem 2: Jamming Policy
In this section, we consider subproblem 2 for optimizing jamming scheduling and power (S J , P J ) with the fixed communication policy and trajectories (S U , P U , Q). Thus, subproblem 2 can be written as 
and constraints C12-C15 are imposed additionally due to the application of the big-M formulation [46] . Furthermore, the binary constraint C3 is another major obstacle for designing a computationally-efficient jamming algorithm. Therefore, the binary constraint C3 can be written in its equivalent form:
However, the optimization problem is still hard to solve due to the non-convex constraints C1 and C3b. Note that C1 and C3b are in the form of the difference of two convex functions w.r.t. p J m,i [n] and s J m,i [n], respectively [17] . Thus, following a similar approach as in [46] , [47] , we can augment the difference of convex (D.C.) constraints C1 and C3b into the objective function with two penalty factors ζ and ϕ, which result in an equivalent problem. March 17, 2020 DRAFT Hence, problem (39) can be rewritten in its equivalent canonical form of D.C. programming as following maximize η, S J ,P J ,P J
where F 1 (η, S J , P J ) and F 2 (S J , P J ) are given by
and we define
Although it is still hard to solve the non-convex problem (46) optimally, by utilizing the technique of SCA, we can obtain a locally optimal solution for problem (46) [48] . For the SCA technique, with a given feasible point at each iteration, the nonconvex constraints can be approximated by the corresponding convex constraints, such that an approximated convex optimization problem can be obtained. Then, by iteratively solving
Now, the optimization problem in (50) is a convex optimization problem which can be solved efficiently by standard convex problem solvers, such as CVX [42] . To tighten the obtained lower bound, we adopt an iterative algorithm to generate a sequence of feasible solutions successively, cf. Algorithm 2. The initial feasible solution with iteration index l 2 = 0 is obtained by solving the convex optimization problem in (50) with F 1 (η, S J , P J ) as the objective function [46] which is shown in line 2 of Algorithm 2. Then, the intermediate solution from the last iteration will be used to update the problem in (50) and it will generate a feasible solution for the next iteration in l 2 = l 2 + 1, as shown in line 5 of Algorithm 2. The iterative procedure will stop either the changes of optimization variables are smaller than a predefined convergence tolerance or the number of iteration reaches its maximum.
C. Subproblem 3: Trajectory Optimization
In this section, we consider subproblem 3 for optimizing the trajectory design by assuming that (S U , S J , P U , P J ) are fixed. Thus, subproblem 3 can be written as
However, the optimization problem is still non-convex due to constraints C1, C8, and C9. To facilitate the development of solution, we first introduce four slack variables 
Similarly, the leakage rate in constraint C1 can be written as 
Therefore, the problem can be written as
, and t m,k E [n], respectively, problem (66) is equivalent to problem (55), as constraints C12 -C15 hold with equalities at the optimal point of problem (66) [1] , [18] .
However, problem (66) is still non-convex due to the non-convex constraintsĈ1, C8, C9, C14, C15, C16, and C18. Although it is hard to solve the non-convex problem (66) optimally, similar to the case for solving subproblem 2, by utilizing the technique of SCA, we can obtain a locally optimal solution for problem (66). To this end, we first handle constraintĈ1. Since
We have the following inequalities by applying the first order Taylor expansion at any given point
whereŘ 
whereŘ
inĈ1, constraintĈ1 can be written aŝ
Then, we handle the non-convex NFZ constraint C8
Similarly, we approximate the non-convex constraint C9, C14, and C15 as followinĝ
Now, with the more stringent constraintsĈ1,Ĉ8,Ĉ9,Ĉ14, andĈ15, a suboptimal solution of (55) can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem
which is a convex optimization problem and can be solved efficiently by standard convex problem solvers such as CVX [42] , which is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Trajectory Design Optimization Algorithm
1: Initialize the maximum number of iterations L l 3 max , iteration index l l 3 = 0, and the maximum tolerance l 3 . 2: Set the initial values as η (0) , Q (0) , t 
5:
Algorithm 4 Iterative Resource Allocation and Trajectory Optimization Algorithm 1: Initialize the maximum number of iterations L l 4 max , iteration index l4 = 0, and the maximum tolerance l 4 . 2: repeat
3:
For the fixed jamming policy and trajectory, obtain the optimal communication resource allocation {S * U , P * U } and intermediate average minimum secrecy rate η l 1 by using Algorithm 1.
4:
For the fixed communication resource allocation and trajectory, obtain the jamming policy {SJ , PJ } and intermediate average minimum secrecy rate η l 2 by using Algorithm 2.
5:
For the fixed communication resource allocation and jamming policy, obtain the trajectory Q and intermediate average minimum secrecy rate η l 3 by using Algorithm 3.
6:
PJ }, and Q l 4 = Q. 7: until convergence or iteration index reaches to the maximum number.
D. Overall Algorithm
In summary, the proposed algorithm solves the three subproblems (20) , (38) , and (55) in an alternating manner with a polynomial time computational complexity. The details of the proposed algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 4. Since the objective value of (18) with the solutions obtained by solving subproblems (20) , (38) , and (55) is non-decreasing over iterations and feasible solution set is bounded, the solution obtained by the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a suboptimal solution with a polynomial time computational complexity [7] , [46] .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS In this section, we investigate the performance of the proposed UAV-enabled secure communication scheme through simulations. Unless specified otherwise, the system parameters are given as follows. All ground users are placed on the ground within the area of 500 × 500 m 2 . Two UAVs are dispatched to provide communications to two ground users with the existence with two potential eavesdroppers. Furthermore, we assume that the two UAVs' initial locations and final locations in 2D area are q 0 1 = (0, 0), q F 1 = (500, 0), q 0 2 = (0, 500), and q F 2 = (500, 500), respectively. The communication bandwidth is 2 MHz with a carrier center frequency at 2 GHz, the number of subcarrier N F = 16, and the noise power on each subcarrier is −100 dBm with channel gain β 0 = −50 dB at the reference distance d 0 = 1 m. Therefore, the channel gain-to-noise ratio at the reference distance is γ 0 = 80 and w k2 U = (400, 450), respectively. Furthermore, as in [8] , [17] , [18] , we assume that three eavesdroppers' locations are exactly known as w 1 E = (70, 70), w 2 E = (150, 250), and w 3 E = (250, 150). For illustration, all the trajectories are sampled every second.
In our simulation, we compare the performance of the proposed algorithm, denoted as PA with the other two baseline schemes: a) No jammer (NJ), which all UAVs serve as information UAV and do not transmit artificial noise to eavesdroppers [14] - [16] . Since the problem for PA subsumes the NJ scheme as a subcase, the average minimum secrecy rate per user in NJ can be achieved by solving subproblem 1 and subproblem 3 with the settings of jamming power as zero. (b) Single-purpose UAV (SP), which one UAV can provide communication while the other is acting as a jammer at all time [17] , [18] , [20] . SP is also a subcase for PA, and the average minimum secrecy rate in PA can be obtained by solving the problem in (18) with fixing UAV 1 as a jammer and UAV 2 as a base station. that when T is relatively small (e.g. T = 28 s), UAV 1 first goes directly towards ground user 1 (GU 1) and hovers over it before flying back straightly to the destination, whereas the behavior of UAV 2 is totally different. This is because all three eavesdroppers are closer to GU 1 compared to GU 2. Specifically, eavesdropper 1 is in close proximity to GU 1 which incurs a high risk in information leakage. Therefore, UAV 2 first acts as a jammer and flies close to all the eavesdroppers as possible at the beginning to help UAV 1 for secure communications. After UAV 1 conveys enough secure data to GU 1, UAV 1 switches its role to a jamming UAV while on its way back to its final location. Concurrently, to achieve fairness in resource allocation, UAV 2 flies towards GU 2 and transmits information to GU that of all users even if jamming is performed. To prevent information leakage, both UAVs would not communicate to any ground user, as revealed in Lemma 3. Therefore, there is neither communication nor jamming in the system in this period. Furthermore, when UAV 2 is close enough to GU 2 for efficient secure communication at n ≥ 38, UAV 1 starts serving as a jammer on its journey to final destination to protect GU 2 against eavesdropping. It is also observed that when the straight direction between a UAV and the desired location is blocked by a NFZ, the UAV's trajectory of the proposed scheme would take the shortest path along the tangential line of the NFZ. Also, the roles of both the UAVs remain the same before cruising back to their corresponding destinations. We can also observe that when the mission time duration is sufficiently long (e.g. T = 60 s), UAV 2 would spend more time March 17, 2020 DRAFT and hover over at some locations close to eavesdropper 1 to fully exploit the additional time as a jammer for efficient jamming. Moreover, UAV 2 keeps safety distance with UAV 1 and there is no collision between them thanks to the collision avoidance constraint C9 in the problem formulation. the JU-SP UAV flies close to the centroid location formed by the three eavesdroppers to improve secrecy rate communication. In particular, to avoid UAVs collision, JU-SP moves away from its hovering location to give way for CU-SP. This is because in baseline 2, there is only one communication UAV for serving all users which imposes a very stringent restriction in utilizing the system resources for maximizing the average minimum secrecy rate. v max = 20 m/s. Also, it can be observed that the average minimum secrecy rates achieved by PA and NJ both increase with mission duration time T . However, for SP, the average minimum secrecy rate is zero until the mission duration time T is longer than 53 s. This is because the only communication UAV in SP has insufficient time to reach closer to GU 2 and to provide secure communication. As a result, the UAV would not transmit anything to avoid information leakage, as revealed in Lemma 3. Furthermore, we can observe that the system performance of PA increases sharply from 30 s to 40 s while the average minimum secrecy rate of NJ scales up slowly. In fact, a sufficiently long time duration grants a UAV more time to reach and stay close to its desired location to enjoy a short distance communication.
A. Proposed Trajectories with Different Mission Time Durations

B. Baseline Trajectories with Fixed Mission Duration Time
C. Average Minimum Secrecy Rate versus Mission Duration Time
Besides, the proposed role switching for UAVs grants the UAVs much higher flexibility to 6 demonstrates the achieved average minimum secrecy rate versus the maximum transmission power for all schemes for T = 60 s. It can be observed that the average minimum secrecy rates achieved by all schemes increase with the maximum transmission power at the beginning. Indeed, a higher data rate can be achieved with a higher power when the UAVs are close to their desired users. However, the system performance of all three algorithms is saturated when the maximum transmission power is sufficiently high. This is because eavesdropper 1 is in the neighbourhood of GU 1, a higher transmission power may incur a higher information leakage and the UAV would clip its transmit power at a certain level despite there is still transmit power available. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the performance gain achieved by our proposed algorithm PA are quite large at all times compared to other two baselines which unveils that role switching among UAVs is the key for improving the system performance. In addition, the average minimum secrecy rate of both SP and NJ schemes scale slowly w.r.t. the available power compared to the proposed scheme as they are less efficient in exploiting the extra transmission power for improving the system performance. Also, despite a higher maximum transmission power grants all UAVs March 17, 2020 DRAFT higher capabilities to improve secure communication system performance, single-purpose UAVs perform the worst among all the considered schemes as they are not competent for time-critical mission in secure communication systems due to the distributed nature of GUs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new communication approach with multi-purpose UAVs which can either provide communication to users or serve as jammers to transmit noise signal to eavesdroppers. By exploiting the UAVs' high mobility, we maximize the average minimum Denote η * 1 and η * 2 as the optimal values of problems (18) and (19), respectively. Since [x] + ≥ x, ∀x, we have η * 1 ≥ η * 2 . Next, we prove that η * 2 ≥ η * 1 holds either. Denote (Q * , S * U , S * J , P * U , P * J ) as the optimal solution to (18), where P * U = {p * m,k U ,i [n], ∀n, m, k U , i}. Define f (p m,k U ,i [n]) = R m,k U ,i [n] − R m,k U ,k E ,i [n]. We construct a feasible solution (Q,Ŝ U ,Ŝ J ,P U ,P J ) to (19) , such thatQ = Q * , S U = S * U ,Ŝ J = S * J ,P J = P * J , and the elements ofP U can be obtained as: if f (p m,k U ,i [n]) ≥ 0, P m,k U ,i [n] = P * m,k U ,i [n]; otherwiseP m,k U ,i [n] = 0. Denoteη as the objective value of (19) attained atQ,Ŝ U ,Ŝ J ,P U ,P J . Therefore, the newly constructed solution (Q,Ŝ U ,Ŝ J ,P U ,P J ) ensuresη = η * 1 , but also is feasible to (19) , which follows that η * 2 ≥η and thus η * 2 ≥ η * 1 . Therefore, η * 2 = η * 1 , which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The Hessian of ψ(x, y) x log 2 (1 + κ 1 y x ) − x log 2 (1 + κ 2 y x ) is given by 
For any t = [t 1 , t 2 ] T , we have
It is easy to verify that, for κ 1 > κ 2 ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, and y ≥ 0,
so that t T 2 ψ(x, y)t ≤ 0,
when κ 1 > κ 2 ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, and y ≥ 0. Therefore, the Hessian ψ(x, y) is a negative semi-definite matric and ψ(x, y) is a concave function w.r.t. x and y.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
If UAV m allocates a non-negative power for user k U on subcarrier i in time slot n, i.e., 
